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You can trust the ladder, but you shouldn’t
1. Introduction
My claim in this paper is that, contra what I take to be the orthodoxy in the wider literature, we do trust
inanimate objects—per the example in the title, there are cases where people really do trust a ladder (to
hold their weight, for instance), and, perhaps most importantly, that this poses a challenge to that
orthodoxy. My argument consists of 4 parts. In section 2 I introduce an alleged distinction between trust
as mere reliance and trust as a rich, morally loaded notion. In the course of doing so, I briefly sketch
some models of trust. This will help us to get a handle on how some of the mainstream models of trust
preclude or ignore the trusting of inanimate objects. In section 3 I introduce cases designed to show that
we have reason to think that we do trust inanimate objects. In section 4 I consider an objection, and, in
section 5 I discuss some consequences of this finding, before concluding in section 6.
2. Kinds of trust
In the literature on trust it’s common enough to see a two-fold distinction drawn between different kinds
of trust. Following Faulkner (2015), I’ll distinguish these kinds of trust as follows. First, we have trust as a
two-place predicate, such that ‘x trusts y’. Example: Tasha trusts Marvin. Second, an agent, x, may trust
another agent, y, to perform some action, φ: x trusts y to φ. Call this ‘contractual trust’. ‘Contractual trust’ 
is a three-place term, connecting two agents to some action. Example: Tasha trusts Marvin to lock the
door. The third main notion associated with trust is general trustworthiness. ‘Trustworthiness’ is a one-
place predicate. Example: Tasha is trustworthy. Of these notions of trust, this paper will be focused only
on the notion of contractual trust: x trusts y to φ.  
Within the literature that concerns itself with contractual trust, it’s typical to see a further distinction
drawn between trust as ‘mere reliance’ and a richer, morally loaded notion of trust. I cannot put the
relevant points any better than Hawley (2014a: 2):
we often rely upon inanimate objects but we do not grant them the rich trust we sometimes grant
one another; inanimate objects can be reliable but not genuinely trustworthy. Moreover our
reactions to misplaced trust differ from our reactions to misplaced reliance. Suppose I trust you
to look after a precious glass vase, yet you carelessly break it. I may feel betrayed and angry;
recriminations will be in order; I may demand an apology. Suppose instead that I rely on a shelf
to support the vase, yet the shelf collapses, breaking the vase. I will be disappointed, perhaps
upset, but it would be inappropriate to feel betrayed by the shelf, or to demand an apology from
it.
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In what follows, I will speak of mere reliance and of rich trust, by way of short hand for these different
notions. My argument in short is that whilst I agree with Hawley and others that (e.g.) it would be
inappropriate to trust the shelf to hold the vase; to feel betrayed by the shelf if the vase falls; to demand an
apology from it; to blame the shelf: nonetheless, I do not see that as any barrier to doing so. I am capable
of doing the inappropriate (as those who know me can testify), as are many others. Demonstrating that
this is (that we can and do trust inanimate obejcts) so and that this poses a challenge to the orthodoxy is
my main aim here.
To get the ball rolling, we can start by noting that on Hawley’s account we cannot have rich trust in
inanimate objects.
Here is my account of trust and distrust:
To trust someone to do something is to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and to
rely upon her to meet that commitment... (2014a: 11)
An inanimate object is not properly described as ‘someone’. That being so, aside from the quote given
above where Hawley explicitly states that we do not richly trust inanimate objects (‘we often rely upon
inanimate objects but we do not grant them the rich trust we sometimes grant one another’), her very
definition of contractual trust prohibits rich (contractual) trust from being granted to inanimate objects.
Elsewhere, Hawley (2014b: 2029-30—my emphasis) appears similarly clear:
There are rival philosophical accounts of what trust is. But most have a common underlying form:
trusting someone to do something involves relying upon her to do it, plus some extra factor which
distinguishes genuine trust from the attitude of (mere) reliance we may take to inanimate objects like climbing
ropes, cars or crash helmets.
To unpack: the first sentence tells us that there are various analyses of what trust consists in—of what
trust itself is. The first part of the second sentence tells us that these accounts of trust have a common
form, and the second part tells us that these accounts distinguish cases of trusting someone to do
something, from other cases, where we take an attitude of (mere) reliance, which is taken to be the
attitude of trust we have towards inanimate objects. Thus, this seems to give us a fairly clear
pronouncement to the effect that most philosophical accounts of trust distinguish genuine trust (that we
have in people) from mere reliance (an attitude we may take to inanimate objects—though it is certainly
true that we frequently merely rely on people, too).
Richard Holton (1994: 67—my emphasis) makes remarks that appear equally suggestive:
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I think that the difference between trust and reliance is that trust involves something like a
participant stance towards the person you are trusting. When you trust someone to do
something, you rely on them to do it, and you regard that reliance in a certain way: you have a
readiness to feel betrayal should it be disappointed, and gratitude should it be upheld. In short,
you take a stance of trust towards the person on whom you rely. It is the stance that make the
difference between reliance and trust. When the car breaks down we might be angry; but when a friend lets
us down we feel betrayed.
Karen Jones (2006: 6—emphasis mine) takes a similar line:
[Three-place t]rust is accepted vulnerability to another person’s power over something one cares
about, where (1) the truster foregoes searching (at the time) for ways to reduce such vulnerability,
and (2) the truster maintains normative expectations of the one-trusted that they not use that
power to harm what is entrusted.
Jones here explicitly defines trust as a relation that one stands in to another person’s power.
Similarly, Pettit (2004: 111, see especially Fig 1) categorises reliance as coming in two forms: on persons
and on non-persons. Trust is then categorised as a particular kind of reliance on persons. That being so,
given this is a categorical scheme, it follows that we do not trust non-persons, such as inanimate objects, to
perform particular actions.
Baier (1986: 259) describes trust as follows: ‘[t]rust, I have claimed, is reliance on others' competence and
willingness to look after, rather than harm, things one cares about which are entrusted to their care.’
Ladders, chairs, shelves: these objects, all inanimate, are neither willing nor unwilling. As such, we cannot
(in current terms, richly) trust them. Given Baier’s entirely justified influence in the literature, I think that
this is significant.
Finally, at the outset of her SEP entry, McLeod (2015—emphasis mine) also appears to rule out the idea
that trust extends to inanimate objects:
Trust is an attitude that we have towards people whom we hope will be trustworthy, where
trustworthiness is a property, not an attitude.
This is an identity claim and one that identifies trust as a relation that we (as people) have towards other
people.
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Purely from the point of view of getting a feel for the field, I take it that McLeod’s remarks are perhaps
the most salient here. An SEP article is a gateway to a topic, written by an expert in the field, who is
seeking to present that field to the interested reader. And, as she defines it right from the outset, McLeod
presents trust as being an attitude that we have towards people.
Others appear to pursue a slightly different approach. For example, Hieronymi (2008: 213) is explicit that
she is restricting her focus to cases of contractual trust between people. One natural way to see my paper in
response to those who restrict in this way is that they are providing us only with a partial account of
contractual trust. I don’t think that we can say that same about those cited a little earlier, such as Hawley,
Jones or McLeod who seem to be offering us very generally claims about what trust is, without any stated
restrictions in place (I’ll come on to the possibility of tacit restrictions in a moment).
So, here is my guiding thought: it seems apparent that the orthodoxy identifies trust as a relation that
people stand in to other people. The analyses of trust are, I think, most reasonably interpreted as ruling
trust inanimate objects impossible.
There is scope for disagreement. Here is a line of reply that one might offer to the thought that I’m
correct and that there is an orthodoxy that rules out our trusting inanimate objects. Hawley (2014a: 11)
says that, “[t]o trust someone to do something is to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and to
rely upon her to meet that commitment. To distrust someone to do something is to believe that she has a
commitment to doing it, and yet not rely upon her to meet that commitment.” Hawley is, however,
providing a definition of what it is to trust or distrust someone; that doesn’t prevent us from having a
further account of what it is to trust inanimate objects, and even though Hawley precedes her definition
by describing the account as her ‘account of trust and distrust’, not merely of trust or distrust in someone,
we shouldn’t read anything of significance into that framing.
Similarly, Baier is concerned with the ethics of trust. That being so, it might be reasonable to view Baier
as, albeit tacitly, thinking only about trust as it involves persons. And, finally, Pettit is concerned with the
rationality of trust. That being so, it’s plausible to simply view his paper as offering us an account of trust
that is restricted in its scope, to tell us only about cases involving the trust of people. So, treating these
cases as representative, rather than having an orthodoxy that’s hostile to or inconsistent with the
possibility of trust in inanimate objects, might it not be the case that these philosophers have, to this
point, simply been tacitly restricting their target, and ignoring cases involving inanimate objects?
For what it’s worth, I find that position somewhat tricky to sustain given what’s said. When Hawley
(2014b: 2029-30) surveys the field she says that ‘[t]here are rival philosophical accounts of what trust is. But
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most have a common underlying form: trusting someone to do something involves relying upon her to
do it, plus some extra factor’; this seems to be a clear move from seeking an analysis of what trust is, to then
treating that very thing—that very account of what trust is—as something that obtains between people.
And, as she goes on in that quotation, trust is to be differentiated from the mere reliance that we have in
inanimate objects.
Another example of an author proceeding when in this way when taking a view of the field can be drawn
from Simpson’s recent work. Simpson (2012: 550) begins by outlining what he takes to be the dominant
methodology within the philosophical literature on trust. I quote extensively to avoid the charge that I am
cherry picking at all.
The task of this article is to elucidate the concept of trust. The paradigm way that analytic
philosophers have addressed tasks of this nature is through conceptual analysis, assuming that
the rules of correct use are determinate and therefore statable, perhaps because there is some
particular phenomenon to which the term refers. At its zenith, the project issues in a definition
stated in necessary and sufficient conditions, using only terms understood more clearly than the
definiendum. The influential philosophical treatments of trust have generally assumed something
akin to this: ‘trust is this’.
Simpson (2012: 551) does not in fact believe that trust is amenable to conceptual analysis. At the outset of
section 2 of the paper, he states the following:
Why should trust not be amenable to conceptual analysis? Against some, I do not think that
conceptual analysis is always a hopeless project. Nor do I have an argument to show that trust
must be too heterogeneous to be defined, so I have no knock-down reply to the question. But
even if no conclusive reasons are available, I suggest that some forceful ones can begiven for not
persevering with attempts to analyse trust, and for trying a different way.
An inductive reason is the ease with which counter-examples can be produced to existing
definitions.
At this point, then, Simpson has noted a general philosophical project: providing a conceptual anlaysis of
trust. He has not looked to provide caveats, such that the project of providing a conceptual anlaysis of
trust is to be understood as the project of providing a conceptual analysis of trust in people, and, at least so
far as I can see, there is nothing in the framing that suggests that Simpson would intend the project to be
shaped in that way. He then goes on to note that: ‘[t]hree major ways of thinking about trust have
emerged in the literature’ (Simpson, 2012: 551). The three major ways he identifies are those positions
taken by Baier, Jones and Holton. And, as we saw above, if we treat those authors as providing a
conceptual analysis of trust itself (as opposed to trust in people), then these analyses preclude our placing
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trust in inanimate objects. Simpson thus appears to endorse my view of the literature. As does Hawley in
her summary of the field. The prevailing view thus seems to be that trust—what trust is—is something
that can only be given to objects that are not inanimate.
But, if we really can explain all of this away by appeal to tacit restriction, supposing that each philosopher
is happy to simply ignore cases of trust in inanimate objects, then I think that we have a different challenge
to the orthodoxy. If we can show that there are cases where we do trust inanimate objects, then we should
not rule out cases of trust in inanimate objects from our discussions precisely because discussion of these
further cases will, very likely, tell us something interesting about the nature of trust (itself). At the very
least, cases of trust in inanimate objects will provide a plausibly fertile ground for developing
counterexamples to accounts of trust. Indeed, and to come full circle and return to Hawley’s (2014a)
work on trust, a key part of her (I think crucial) methodological insight in that paper is that our analysis of
distrust can tell us something of value about trust, and that as such we should not ignore distrust in our
analyses. Similarly, then: if we can have trust inanimate objects, we should not ignore it when trying to
understand what trust is, even if we are ultimately more interested in cases of interpersonal trust.
To see why, note the following. Suppose that we have trusting-people-to as one kind of trusting-to, and
trusting-inanimate-objects as another kind of trusting-to. That would leave a further question in need of
an answer: if these are both instances of trusting-to, then in virtue of what is this so? That is, if trusting-
people-to is one kind of trusting-to, and trusting-inanimate-objects-to is another kind of trusting to, then
what is trusting-to simpliciter? And, if there is no such thing, then in virtue of what do these two kinds of
trusting-to warrant the name? Certainly, it would be most natural to suppose that there is an umbrella
form of trusting-to such that these are both instances of it. For more on the question of why to think that
the possibility of trusting inanimate objects may impact how we think about trust, see discussion in
section 5.
I’m not going to dwell on the details of the many competing accounts of trust discussed here (nor will I
later try to offer a corrective to these different accounts—though see section 5 for some limited
discussion). All that matters is that each of these accounts of trust either precludes rich trust in inanimate
objects, or else simply offers a restricted analysis of trust and thereby ignores cases that might involve
inanimate objects.
I claim that debates about the nature of three-place trust should ensure that the analyses provided are
compatible with instances of trust in inanimate objects and that they include such cases in their
considerations. To show this, in section 3 I introduce some cases in which it appears correct to say that
we can trust inanimate objects. In section 4 I’ll explore the objection that I’ve not properly identified an
orthodoxy and in section 5 some of the consequences of this result.
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3. Cases
With those distinctions drawn, and accounts of trust given, I now want to describe the cases (more are
mentioned in the footnotes—see fn3, fn5 and fn8) in which I think it’s right and proper to agree that an
agent richly trusts an inanimate object.1 The general strategy in each case will be as follows. I will describe
a case in which I think it’s reasonable to say that the putative trustor really does trust some inanimate
object. I will suggest (though this is speculative on my part) that the reason that the putative trustors engage
in that trust is because they have, to some extent, likely anthropomorphised the object in question. I do
not say that they have strongly committed to attributing to it beliefs, desires, and so on. Rather, I suggest
that it looks reasonable in each case to suppose that the putative trustor is treating the inanimate object
roughly as if it’s some kind of agent. Here is the first case.
Wiley is 4; old enough to read a little, but young enough to still be credulous. Wiley’s most treasured
possession is his blackboard and chalk set. He loves writing and drawing on it. One day, Wiley comes
down for breakfast to see a prediction about the weather stated on the blackboard: ‘today it will rain’. Lo
and behold, it does! The next day, a similar thing happens. This time the prediction is: ‘today the sun will
shine’. And, it does! The same pattern repeats itself each day, with the prediction on the blackboard
coming true. Wiley forms the view that the blackboard is magical. Somehow, he thinks, the blackboard is
communicating with him about the weather. Now, as it happens, what’s going on here is that Wiley’s
sister, Jerlene, is reviewing the weather forecast and writing it onto his blackboard. She doesn’t tell him
that she’s doing it and, overhearing some of the things that Wiley is saying to the blackboard, over time
also starts to include responses to what Wiley says in her messages. She thinks it a wonderful prank. Over
time, Wiley comes to trust the ‘magic’ blackboard to tell him what the weather will be (among other
things); at least, he says that he does. (For reasons that may already be apparent, and that are associated
with her tendency to be somewhat unkind to Wiley, Wiley does not trust Jerelne.)
Now suppose that Jerlene starts to use the blackboard to manipulate Wiley into wearing unseasonable
clothing (t-shirt and shorts in the middle of winter, for instance), and suffering as a consequence. Wiley
blames his magic blackboard for misleading him. To borrow language from the literature, Wiley will have
many of the ‘reactive attitudes’ that are associated with a breach of trust (resentment, betrayal,
disappointment, etc.).2 Wiley is being tricked into forming these attitudes towards the blackboard; it is not
appropriate for him to form these attitudes: nonetheless, form them he does. In this case, Wiley will self-
report as trusting the blackboard and seem to be engaging with the board as a moral agent; blaming it,
resenting it, being disappointed by it, etc. This seems to be good evidence that Wiley trusts the
blackboard to tell him particular things about the weather. Certainly, there is nothing conceptually
incoherent about Wiley coming to trust, and not merely relying upon, the blackboard to tell him things,
1 Even if, and we must not lose sight of this, they should not have done. My claim that it is true to say that agents trust inanimate
objects is not to be mistaken for the claims that it is appropriate for them to do so.
2 For the general claim that these kinds of reactive attitude are signifiers of trust, inter alia, Holton (1994); Jones (1996).
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and experiencing these reactive attitudes if that trust is broken. Of course, Wiley shouldn’t trust the
blackboard. He shouldn’t blame the blackboard if it (/Jerlene) misleads him. Wiley just shouldn’t have
these reactive attitudes towards the blackboard. After all, it’s a blackboard; it is an inanimate object. But,
again, that is not the point. The point is that he can come to richly trust the blackboard, and that is all that
we require—that an agent can trust an inanimate object to carry out particular actions.
A further concern: isn't it the case that Wiley trusts, because he (falsely) ascribes the blackboard an agency
it does not have? Wiley ascribes agency and thus potentially even intentionality to an object. Wiley, we
may say, takes a participant stance towards the blackboard (c.f Holton (1994)). We don't ordinarily do
that. It is plausible in this case to think that Wiley trusts the blackboard only because we are imagining the
blackboard as being perceived by Wiley as magical; that is, as having agency. Otherwise this would be
mere reliance.3
I’m not sure how this is supposed to help my opponent. I agree with this imagined opponent that rich
trust is not appropriate.4 But, if Wiley is ascribing that agency, then that error is precisely what is doing the
work for me in this case: trust occurs because of the error in agency ascription. This will be the key point to
which we will return: contractual trust is entered into by agents because they make an error of some kind.
The second kind of case of richly trusting inanimate objects is one that trades upon superstition.
Consider, for instance, a case where a member of a police force comes to ‘trust’ some particular item of
body-armour that has saved their life on previous occasions. Our police-officer, Mel, refuses new armour,
despite the fact that those around Mel insist that it would be for the best to have it replaced. In fact, Mel
comes to form such a close bond with the armour that she refuses to allow the armour to be maintained
by those who would normally do so, resorting to subterfuge to ensure that no-one else lays a hand on her
armour. Mel believes: ‘I trust this body-armour to protect me; no-one is allowed to touch it, but me’.
Aside from being a little delusional, how should we understand Mel’s state of mind here? Well, at least as
I am describing the case, having been in many scrapes together, Mel has (irrationally) come to the view
that her body-armour is somehow special; that without it she may come to harm, and, though she does
3 A similar kind of case: a child might trust a teddy or similar toy to do something for them and might well feel let down if the
action is not performed. For instance, my daughter once self-described as trusting her bear to look after her in the dark, became
scared in the dark, and then resented the bear for not having done a better job of looking after her. Of course, she clearly
shouldn’t have trusted the bear to look after her, but (at least so far as I can tell—and I was there) she really did trust the bear to
look after her. Relatedly, a somewhat unkind piece of satire at the expense of President Bush (Jr), describes a fictional case where
he felt betrayed by a magic 8 ball. http://frowl.org/stuff/8ball.html Google searches will reveal to the reader that a number of
internet users will certainly describe themselves as trusting magic 8-balls, as well. The point, again, is simply that people can have
the requisite, trust-related, reactive attitudes towards inanimate objects, whilst relying upon them, and that this is good evidence
that they can also trust them to perform particular tasks.
4 Actually, that’s a little incautious. Given Wiley’s position, I think that from some points of view it’s actually perfectly
appropriate for him to trust the blackboard. It is inappropriate for him to do so only in the sense that his trust is based on a lie.
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not go so far as to impute beliefs or commitments to the armour, nonetheless takes herself to have
formed a tight bond with it and has an attitude (and emotional feeling of) trust towards the body-armour.5
Equally, it is not at all unreasonable to suppose that, in the event of the armour failing, Mel will
experience many of the ‘reactive attitudes’ that are standardly taken to indicate if x’s trusting y to perform
some action is betrayed (cf. Faulkner 2014: 335). To illustrate: if the armour fails her (perhaps a soft-spot
has developed that fails to deflect a blow from a criminal she is pursuing), Mel might respond with
feelings of resentment; feelings of betrayal; a feeling that the armour has let her down. These reactive
attitudes may be thought to function a little like markers of trust. If they are present in such a case (and,
again, it seems reasonable to suppose that they may be), then that gives us reason to think that trust is
present. (Of course, a determined proponent of one or other of the models of trust might simply insist
that this is not an instance of trust. But what I cannot see is why one would take that approach. Simply:
let us begin by looking at a plausible case. Since this looks like a case of trust—with the right kinds of
reactive attitude present, but in which there is no attribution of agency, for these attitudes do not
obviously require any such attribution—so we should treat it as such.)
Similar cases of superstition-leading-to-trust could be generated out of any form of religion that
advocated the worship (and rich trust) of an object that is in fact inanimate, but to which agency was
nonetheless ascribed. If, for instance, we agree that the sun lacks agency, then the early Egyptian religion
of Atenism, that advocated the worship of the sun (not a figure, such as Amun, who was supposed
merely to reside within the sun) might present an interesting case. Those who followed Atenism could,
quite reasonably I shall assume, have described themselves as trusting the Sun to deliver particular
protections and bring particular goods. They would have been wrong to do so (or so I shall assume), for
the sun is not in fact animate (with apologies to panpsychists). Nonetheless, they could very well have
trusted the sun to protect them/to deliver goods unto them, because they wrongly ascribed agency to it.
In such cases, it seems to me that agents do in fact trust the object in question and, if it failed to protect
them/deliver the desired goods, would not necessarily blame those in fact responsible for protecting them
or delivering goods unto them, but might well simply feel betrayed by the inanimate object itself. In short:
if the harvest failed then the Atenists would likely blame the sun, not the farmers. Again, I would not
dispute that such an agent is doing something wrong; something that they ought not to do. Certainly, Mel
is likely irrational to trust the body-armour in this way, and certainly quite wrong to blame it for any injury
5 At the risk of engaging in autobiography I have what I take to be a similar attitude towards my bike. We’ve been in lots of close
scrapes together. I think I trust it. If the bike was to fail, I would likely (perhaps briefly) feel let down by it. I would experience
the same kinds of reactive attitudes to it as I do to someone who lets me down. (Indeed, on one memorable occasion the details
of which are beyond the scope of this paper, I did exactly that). I don’t think it has beliefs, commitments, or what have you.
Nonetheless, the term ‘trust’ seems to me to apply, quite reasonably, and not just in the sense that I can rely on it. The reader is
entitled to make what they will of my irrationality on this score.
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she suffers; similar thoughts may apply to the superstitious sun-worshipper. But, to repeat a now familiar
refrain, that an agent should not behave in some way is no guarantee that they will not do so.
Of course, what is common to the cases that I’ve described is that it seems as if the agent that I am alleging
is doing the trusting is treating the inanimate object it trusts, as an agent. Wiley is treating the blackboard as
an agent that is writing messages to him. Mel is treating her body armour as an agent that has a duty of
protection towards her. Atenists, we are supposing, imputed agency to the sun. And from many points of
view, I think that should be unsurprising. We know that humans anthropomorphise, typically as a quick
and dirty way of forming predictive inferences about the world around them, or else in order to provide
psychologically appealing narrative explanations of various occurrences. So much is not news.6
Abstracting away from the cases, the general challenge to those in the literature whose accounts (if I have
interpreted them correctly) imply that we cannot trust inanimate objects may then be put thus: why should
we suppose that it’s impossible for an agent to trust an inanimate object? (Note, I don’t think any of the
aforementioned philosophers explicitly say that we cannot trust inanimate objects. My claim is that this
result is simply a product of the way in which the analyse rich, contractual trust.) This seems a bold and
unreasonable claim to make in the absence of both strong argument and clear empirical data. Since
neither have been provided, I think that we ought at the very least to suspend judgement about whether it is
possible to trust an inanimate object; better, I think, would be to concede that it is possible, after all. And,
as a secondary point, my suspicion is that what tempts us into trusting in the cases described is the simple
fact that we anthropomorphise. However, though the cases appear to leave that option open—and I’ll say
something a little more about it later on—it is speculation on my part. As above, the core aim of the
paper is to show that we can trust the inanimate and to explore the consequences for the orthodoxy. I
take it that these cases demonstrate that we can.
4. Objection: there is no orthodoxy
Few philosophical claims are uncontentious. Those made here are no exception. I am sure that the reader
can think of many more, but in this section I want to consider what I take to be the most pressing
I've suggested that the accounts of contractual trust given by Baier, Pettit and Hawley (and others) are not
compatible with our being able to trust inanimate objects, or else that they simply ignore cases involving
inanimate objects. But, so goes the thought, there are other accounts. These other accounts are (or may
be, for all that I've said) compatible with our trusting inanimate objects. I stand charged of over-reaching.
I don't have a definitive view on when a group of positions might be regarded as capturing orthodox
sentiment. I'm happy enough to concede ground to my opponent here. If the objection I’m considering
6 See, e.g., Epley, Waytz and Cacioppo (2007) for an overview of some of the psychology here.
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here is just to my use of the term 'orthodox', then so be it: I shall retract. So, for instance, Owens' (2017)
offers an account of trust according to which, 'for X to trust Y is for X to engage with Y in a way that will
realize the value distinctiveness of Y-things (provided this thing is a good Y'). In discussion of promising,
Owens moves from this to contractual trust (or in his terms 'X trusts that Y will A'). 'One trusts that a
promise will be kept whenever one extracts some value or other from the promise by relying on its being
kept'. Were one persuaded by what Owens' has to say here, then perhaps this could be generalised into an
account of contractual trust that permits the trusting of inanimate objects.
For what it's worth, that strikes me as correct. But recall: my claim is not that everyone in the literature is
prone to my concerns here. My target is but a part of that literature. If it turns out that Owens can give us
an account of contractual trust that renders it compatible with our trusting inanimate objects—well then;
all the better for Owens' account.7 Similarly, according to Holton, 'the difference between trust and
reliance is that trust involves something like a participant stance towards the person you are
trusting....trusting someone is one way of treating them as a person.' (1994: 4)
For reasons that may be obvious, I'm very sympathetic. In the cases of trust given to inanimate objects,
my claim is that there is plausible anthropomorphism involved—at least to some degree. This aligns
nicely with Holton's requirement that trusting someone, or something, is one way of treating them as a
person. So, my position is not (and should not be taken to be) that there is no account of contractual trust
that correctly allows that we trust inanimate objects.
Nonetheless, I think that this is all grist to my mill. Suppose that certain accounts of trust (those offered
by the likes of Holton, for instance) carry over very naturally to dealing with cases where we trust
inanimate objects and that others (perhaps those offered by Hawley and Jones—see section 5 for a little
more discussion) don’t. That would seem to speak squarely in favour of those accounts of trust where we
can port our analysis to encompass cases where we trust inanimate objects, and against those where we
cannot.
5. Consequences
What if I’m right? I think that at least three consequences follow. First, and this is obvious, it turns out
that the orthodoxy is false or overly restricted: we can trust inanimate objects (even if we should not) and
this requires our attention. That’s a not insignificant point and one that needs to be recognised. Second, if
we take their analyses at face value as analyses of what trust is (without tacit restriction), then those who
define rich trust in such a way as to preclude the trusting of inanimate objects (that is, if I have the right
7 Nonetheless, it isn't clear to me that we can generalise from Owens' account. Abstracting away from his discussion of
promising would seem to give us the following account of contractual trust: x trusts y to φ when x extracts some value from 
relying on y φ -ing. And that generalisation does not look to be right. If I trust my wife to pick up our daughter from School, and 
she fails to do so, then I extract no obvious value from relying on her to do so.
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reading of the likes of Baier, Hawley, Jones and Pettit), would have to revise their accounts. If it is
possible to richly trust an inanimate object then this is nothing more than an obvious consequence of
what I say here.
More, I don’t think that it would be entirely straightforward to make the necessary modifications—
though I could be wrong about this. Since there are many such accounts of what trust is, with very
different structures, I won’t seek here to try to provide a fix. Simply, it strikes me as unlikely that there is
any single fix that would apply to all such accounts of trust. Nonetheless, it’s easy to see that some parts of
this analysis will have to change. To illustrate, let us return briefly to Hawley’s definition of trust
(assuming we read it as an analysis of trust generally, and taking Hawley literally when she says that this is
intended as an account of trust, and not just as an account of trusting people):
To trust someone to do something is to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and to
rely upon her to meet that commitment. (2014: 11)
We will have to shift from ‘someone’ to ‘something’, at the very least.
I confess I remain uncertain as to how to think about the issue of commitment here. In the cases that I’ve
described, it isn’t clear to me that the trustors need to believe that the trusted entity has a commitment to
doing something. For instance, consider once again the case of Mel and the body armour. Does Mel in
this situation need to think that the body armour in fact has a commitment to protecting her? Hawley’s
analysis requires that Mel does need to think that.8 I’m honestly not at all sure how we decide that issue.
Mel makes an error in trusting the armour; does Mel also make the error of imputing a commitment to the
armour? It’s far from obvious to me that this need be so. To be clear: I don’t say that this poses an
insuperable problem for Hawley. My more mundane point is simply that once we move to allowing that
trustors can trust inanimate objects, I become uncertain as to the extent that we can sensibly ascribe to
trustors the belief that the inanimate object has a commitment to doing something. Perhaps we can ascribe to
trustors the belief that the inanimate object has a commitment in the right kind of way, but this seems to
me an avenue for further research (see, also, discussion below). And that, in itself, is an interesting
consequence to note and something that requires further exploration.
Of course, not all accounts of contractual trust are like Hawley’s; not all trade on an explicit notion of
commitment. Indeed, it is for this reason that I remarked just a moment ago that I would not be looking
to provide a general fix. My aim is not to try and re-write competing accounts of trust, but to point out that
some of them may be in need of such a re-writing. For instance, the account of trust given by Karen
Jones (1996: 1) treats trust as:
8 See, also, fn 5.
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[a]n attitude of optimism that the goodwill and competence of another will extend to cover the
domain of our interaction with her, together with the expectation that the one trusted will be
directly and more favorably moved by the thought that we are counting on her
Once again, and just to pick on one case again: in the body armour case there is simply no reason to think
that Mel takes the body armour to be favourably moved by the thought that Mel is counting on it! Nonetheless, it
does look as if Mel can (albeit inappropriately) trust the armour. Similarly, in the case of Wiley and the
blackboard, though we might be prepared to commit to the idea that Wiley thinks that the blackboard has
a commitment to telling him the truth (though I do find that notion something of a stretch), and so think
this case compatible with Hawley’s account, it seems far harder to swallow the idea that Wiley takes the
blackboard to be favourably moved by the thought that he is counting on it. Even a credulous child
should surely not be required to have that attitude in the situation in question.
There is a resurfacing of a potential moral, here, that I noted at the end of section 4: suppose Hawley’s
account fares a little better here than does Jones’, with being able to account for trust in the case
involving an inanimate object. If that’s right, then it points nicely to the fact that cases involving
inanimate objects may well be of bearing on how we try to clarify our overarching concept of trust, for
certain cases involving inanimate objects might be taken to favour one account of trust over another.
This, in turn, reinforces my point in section 2—that the possibility of being able to trust inanimate objects
has ramifications for how we think about trust generally.
Third, there are plausibly some practical implications—implications that are broad in scope and worth
pointing out here, and again these also bring front and centre the import of being careful to recognise that
we can trust inanimate objects. As is obvious, we regularly interact with inanimate objects. Some of these
inanimate objects are sold to us. Presumably, some inanimate objects that are trusted to carry out a
particular task will sell better than those that are not. This is not speculation on my part. Potential
customers already report distrust of driverless cars, for instance, and this is described in the media as a
barrier to the widespread implementation of the technology.9 If am right about contractual trust, and if I
am right about the role played by anthropomorphisation, there is therefore potentially some motivation
for those designing and marketing this sub-class of products (those that will sell well/better if they are
trusted to carry out some particular task) to do so in such a way as to deceive us into assigning agency to
9 See, e.g., https://arstechnica.co.uk/cars/2015/07/self-driving-cars-are-coming-but-most-drivers-dont-want-them-yet/ For a
very gentle introduction to research on the topic, see http://theconversation.com/why-driverless-cars-still-need-driving-tests-
62721
Note, also, that if one reviews the stated objections from drivers it doesn’t seem to be to the reliability of driverless cars that is at
issue; the concern seems to centre on trust. This case is also a promising avenue for showing that we can richly trust inanimate
objects. If we can, then, again, it seems that our account of trust ought to be modified to ensure that we can accommodate this
possibility.
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them, and thus to trust them to carry out the tasks that we should merely rely upon them to complete. If
we couldn’t trust inanimate objects, this would not be the case. If we couldn’t trust inanimate objects then
the only trust-related goal for the designers and marketers should be one of persuading the buying public
that the product is reliable. (Of course, there will be other tasks for the marketers, too: persuading the
public that the company can be richly trusted, for instance, may well be of commercial value.) Or, if those
in the orthodoxy are simply not considering such cases, then it would be helpful in the extreme were they
to do so.
One obvious (and current) domain where this point is especially pressing is the case of the driverless car
(alluded to above and in fn 8). A recent MIT study found that of those who claimed that they would not
ever purchase a driverless car, some 26% opted for the reason that ‘they did not trust the technology’
(Abrahm, et al. 2017: 9). Note also that we have some reason to think that this notion of trust is the rich,
morally loaded sense, since a further 46% responded that they would never purchase the technology, either
because it wasn’t safe or because it wouldn’t work perfectly. In other words, this 46% appear to have been
concerned that the product would not be reliable. Thus, we have at least some reason, albeit a defeasible
reason, to think that respondents are going some way to distinguishing between (rich) trust and mere
reliance. Notable, too, is that further research on this issue (e.g. Beggiato and Krems (2013)) explicitly
distinguishes a notion of rich trust, contrasts it with mere reliance, and finds that one barrier to the
acceptance of automated vehicles is a lack of trust. That being so, designers and manufacturers will want
us to come to trust these vehicles in order to help potential customers move past this concern and
consider making a purchase.
As an aside, it’s worth noting that the account of trust that is given by Beggiato and Krems, though
clearly gesturing in the direction of a morally loaded conception of trust, isn’t satisfactory for our current
purposes. As Beggiato and Krems (2013: 48) have it, borrowing from Lee and See (2004: 51), trust is:
‘...the attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterised by
uncertainty and vulnerability’. First, then, note that the account of trust just given is that of an attitude: it
is of the form x trusts y. This is not contractual trust: it is not of the form x trusts y to φ. Second even as 
an analysis of attitudinal trust, this seems to me a flawed account. To see why, consider a case discussed
by Hawley (2014a: 9). Imagine a scenario in which Alice brings with her an excess of food every day,
leaving whatever she does not eat on a table in the staff cafeteria. She does so with sufficient reliability
that, unbeknownst to her, I stop bringing lunch with me and stop bringing any money, too. I simply
consume Alice’s leftovers. I am, in short, relying on Alice’s flawed judgements about quantity. Indeed, in
such a situation I will likely have an attitude toward an individual, Alice, such that Alice will help me
achieve my goals (getting fed) in a situation characterised by uncertainty and vulnerability (I do not know
that she will bring an excess of food and if she does not then I do not know how to get access to other
food and am now in a sense ‘vulnerable’ to being very hungry for the rest of the day). Nonetheless, it
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seems quite wrong to say of such a case that I trust Alice.10 That being so, the account of (attitudinal) trust
offered by Beggiato and Krems seems in need of revision.)
Even if one doesn’t find the driverless care case especially persuasive there is also a rich literature that
looks at the connection between automation on the one hand, and trust and reliance on the other. As Lee
and See note in their excellent (2004: 76—my italics) overview:
Trust influences reliance on automation; however, it does not determine reliance... Because
automation and computer technology are growing increasingly complex, the importance of affect
and trust is likely to grow. Computer technology allows people to develop relationships and
collaborate with little or no direct contact, but these new opportunities produce complex
situations that require appropriate trust. As computer technology grows more pervasive, trust is
also likely to become a critical factor in consumer products, such as home automation, personal
robots, and automotive automation. Designing trustable technology may be a critical factor in the
success of the next generation of automation and computer technology.
Therein, as is apparent, Lee and See differentiate trust from reliance, and note the importance (to
consumer products) of developing technology—automated technology—that can be trusted (not just
relied upon). Philosophers, too, must pay attention to cases of trust in automation, and look to provide an
account of what that consists in.
In the face of all of this, it seems hard to maintain either that agents do not contractually trust inanimate
objects or that this result is of little significance. The question of whether we can (e.g.) be brought to trust
driverless cars for instance, and if we can, how we can, is one that will have a significant bearing on our
financial futures, as well as the ways in which we organise the social and domestic elements of our lives.
6. Conclusions.
So, can you (richly) trust a ladder? Yes, but likely only if you treat it as an agent, and even then you probably
shouldn’t. Should you (richly) trust a driverless car? Again, probably not. But if you rely upon it and you
anthropomorphise it with some sense of agency, then it seems to me you probably will.11
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